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Leidschrift, jaargang 27, nummer 1, april 2012 
The Mamluks1 were military slaves of Turkic origin who in 1250 usurped 
the throne of their master, al-Sālih Ayyūb (r. 1240-1249), the Ayyubid sultan 
of Egypt. The Ayyubids had become dependent on mamlūk military power, 
which allowed the army commanders, the mamlūk emirs, to appropriate 
political power. In 1250, the emir Aybak al-Turkmānī (r. 1250-1257) was 
raised from their ranks to become the first Mamluk sultan. During the first 
decade of Mamluk rule, however, chaos and violence reigned supreme. Four 
sultans succeeded each other in ten years; two of them were killed, as were 
several contenders. In 1260 al-Zāhir Baybars I (r. 1260-1277) killed his 
predecessor al-Muzaffar Qutuz (r. 1259-1260), usurping the novel Mamluk 
sultanate. After this last murder a higher degree of political stability was 
established. With his usurpation of the throne Baybars managed to 
safeguard the sovereignty of the Bahriyya household, at the expense of the 
other households that had been established by mamlūk emirs after al-Sālih 
Ayyūb’s death.2 The Bahriyya Mamluks would remain in power until 1382, 
when they were toppled by the Burjiyya household, who would remain in 
power until the Ottoman conquest of 1517. 
An acute difficulty for the Mamluk sultans was the acquisition of 
legitimacy. The parvenu sultan had to explain his position to a number of 
                                                     
* I want to thank Dr. Maaike van Berkel, Prof. dr. Guy Geltner, Prof. dr. Peter 
Rietberger, and Judith Helm for their helpful and detailed feedback on previous 
versions of this article. I also want to thank the other members of the Eurasian 
Empires programme, supervisors and colleagues, for their comments and reactions. 
A special thanks I owe to Dr. Marie Favereau-Doumenjou for giving much needed 
directions to find my way on the Altaic steppes. 
1 The Anglicized word ‘Mamluk’ refers to the Mamluk Dynasty or sultanate (1250-
1415). The Arabic word mamlūk, when used as a noun, means ‘slave soldier’. When 
used as an adjective, it refers to the mamlūk household, i.e. the socio-military unit 
where each mamlūk was garrisoned.  
2 There were several mamlūk households in Cairo, each under the patronage of an 
important emir or the sultan. The sultan had the largest household. The Bahriyya 
household was founded by al-Salih Ayyub, named after the Nile (al-Bahr in 





parties. First, his slave background was improper and a welcome source for 
mockery among neighboring rulers. Most seriously, the Ayyubid princes, 
who remained in power in the Levant, categorically refused to acknowledge 
Mamluk rule. Secondly, in Egypt, he represented an extraneous, foreign elite, 
lacking the ancestry or traditional authority that could make his claim to the 
throne of Egypt credible and acceptable to local standards. Most of their 
subjects considered the Mamluks to be mindless hulks, violent and parvenu. 
Thirdly, the Mamluk sultan had to justify his authority and privileges 
towards his comrades, the emirs, whose fiat was indispensible for domestic 
peace.  
Islam offered a first religious resort to overcome this problem. The 
Mamluks developed an ideal of kingship. Domestically, they expressed 
royal-cum-religious authority by patronizing the traditional Islamic values 
and the court of grievances (mazālim), which heard complaints of the 
sultan’s subjects against state officials. Additionally, they spent a 
considerable amount of their wealth on the creation of cultural capital, 
especially religious architecture. In foreign affairs, the sultan manifested 
himself to the world as the Islamic ruler par excellence, styling himself as the 
ultimate champion of Islam, the protector of the sharia law, and the 
‘servant’ of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. All these were traditional 
qualifications that sunnī Islam required of its leaders. The ongoing war effort 
against the Mongols only enhanced the Mamluk sultan’s image as the 
Guardian of Islam. It was therefore of importance that Mamluk rhetorics of 
power stood out against Mongol ideals of kingship, which had became 
powerful and influential in the Middle East in the wake of the conquests of 
Chengiz Khan, earlier in the thirteenth century.3 
Yet, this traditional Islamic decorum did not necessarily exclude 
more heterodox notions of kingship. Especially during the early Mamluk 
sultanate, certain elements in the representation and depiction of the sultan 
seem to suggest a heterogeneous frame of reference. The native, cultural 
background of the Mamluks, the majority of whom was of Qipchaq Turkic 
extraction, I would like to argue, could be the reason why a native, tribal, 
tradition of kingship, that I will call Altaic – explained hereafter – continued 
to influence the ideas with which the Mamluk sultan ‘defined himself as a 
                                                     
3 A. F. Broadbridge, Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds (Cambridge 
2008) 12-16. 




sovereign,’ and reinforced the legality and legitimacy of his reign, vis-à-vis 
various audiences.4  
In this article I will experiment with the validity of this thought by 
highlighting elements in the story of Baybars’ rise to power and ultimate 
usurpation of the sultanate, as given in a contemporary biography by court-
historian Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir (1223-1292). I would like to argue that, in this 
work, ‘tribal’ notions of sovereignty and kingship are used to explain 
Baybars’ ascent to power to the internal audience of the Mamluk elite. Ibn 
‘Abd al-Zāhir was, as head of the chancellery, one of the important ‘spin 
doctors’ at the Mamluk court, actively involved in matters of state.5 It seems 
therefore that through the analysis of this text, we can gain insight into the 
composition of the representation of the Mamluk sultan. 
  
 
Altaic notions of kingship 
 
A common adjective to specify the non-Arab influences that effected 
cultural expressions throughout the Middle East after the collapse of the 
Caliphate and the migration waves of Turkic and Mongolic peoples is 
‘Turco-Mongolic’.6 In this article, however, I prefer to use the term ‘Altaic’ 
when referring to notions of royal sovereignty, and practices of succession, 
because these notions seem to have been shared beyond the ‘Turco-
Mongolic’ sphere proper. The term ‘Altaic’ is originally a linguistic one that 
refers to a postulated family of languages, including Turkic, Mongolian, and 
Tungusic, spoken over a large stretch of inner Eurasia. Here it refers to 
cultural features shared among the peoples who spoke these languages. The 
adjectives Turkic or Mongolic I will only use when such precision is 
possible. 
The Altaic world was vast, stretching from Korea to Hungary. 
Almost as vast were the social, cultural and political differences among the 
peoples who inhabited it. An overwhelming majority, however, practiced a 
pastoral-nomadic lifestyle or had only recently made the transition to a 
sedentary-agrarian way of life. Typically, the family and the clan were the 
                                                     
4 Broadbridge, Kingship and Ideology, 12-16. 
5 U. Haarmann, Quellenstudien zur frühen Mamlukenzeit. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen I 
(Freiburg 1970) 97-101. 
6  J. Fletcher, ‘Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire’, 





basic underpinnings of society and its political structure. A number of clans 
could form a tribe, ruled by a chief. Moreover, in political terms, it was not 
uncommon for a number of kindred tribes to form a confederation under 
the leadership of a khān or kağān, roughly meaning ‘king’, if not ‘emperor’. 
The eleventh and twelfth centuries also saw the rise of a number of Turkic 
sultanates, founded by nomadic tribes who had migrated into the Middle 
East and adopted Islam and a sedentary lifestyle. The Saljuq sultanate (1071-
1325), which covered at the height of its power Persia, Mesopotamia, and 
Anatolia, serves as the best example of such a state.7  
Altaic political culture was diverse, and not all the peoples had a clear 
tradition of kingship. However, two notions of sovereignty and monarchy 
surface in the sources. The first is the idea that sovereignty is shared among 
all male members of the ruling clan. Where it is possible to speak of a state, 
it was viewed as the common property of the ruling clan. 8 The second, 
directly related, notion of Altaic kingship becomes evident in the practice of 
succession. The idea of shared sovereignty implied that, after the death of a 
khan, succession was open to all male clan members. Those claiming the 
throne would not uncommonly fight each other until death. The winner had 
automatically proven his physical aptitude to rule, which made his accession 
acceptable to all. Joseph Fletcher uses the term ‘tanistry’ to describe this 
phenomenon.9 This violent practice probably had its origin in the harsh 
ecology of the steppes, where a weak leader in war would bring starvation 
instead of bounty. Key to the ideological explanation of this tradition, 
however, was the belief that kingship could not be administered by human 
institutions but only bestowed by divine provenance. By winning the 
struggle for succession, a ruler automatically demonstrated that his rule was 
ordained by God, or any other divine principle.  
Not so much a notion of kingship, but rather characteristic of 
succession practices throughout the Altaic world, was the acclamation or 
acknowledgment of a new leader by his peers. In the Mongol case, tribal 
councils, called khuriltai, performed this function. After the death of the 
                                                     
7 P. Golden, Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples (Wiesbaden 1992). 
8 Golden, History of the Turkic Peoples, 11; H. Inalcık, ‘The Ottoman Succession and 
Its Relation to the Turkish Concept of Sovereignty’ in: Idem ed., The Middle East 
and the Balkans under Ottoman rule (Bloomington 1993) 37-69. 
9  J. Fletcher, ‘Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire’, 
Harvard Journal of Ukrainian Studies 2-4 (1979-80) 236-251; Inalcık, ‘The Ottoman 
Succession and Its Relation to the Turkish Concept of Sovereignty’, 37-69. 




khan, several pretenders to the throne could rally support and have 
themselves acclaimed the new khan in tribal councils. Violent struggle 
between the different cadres of support would ensue after conflicting 
acclamations. When a victor had emerged, he would be acclaimed khan for 
a second time and a oath of loyalty would be sworn by the chiefs of the 
other clans.10  
After the disintegration of the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258) and the 
increasing migrations of Turkic peoples into the heart lands of the Middle 
East, Islamic and tribal monarchic traditions in many cases, such as that of 
the Saljuqs, began to overlap and, especially in the eastern parts of the 
Middle East became blended with Persian, native cultural elements. In the 
wake of the increasing power of non-Arab, Perso-Turkish polities breaking 
away from the Caliphate, Islamic scholars, such as al-Mawardī, 
acknowledged the political status quo by explaining that violent usurpations, 
under some conditions, were permissible, for instance to do away with a 
weak ruler who jeopardized the safety of the Muslim community. In 
traditional sunnī terms, however, rebellion against divinely invested authority 
was considered illegitimate. Finally, the tribal principle of tanistry, a fortiori, 
was alien to orthodox Islamic political thought. Moreover, the Muslim ideal 
of kingship required that a sultan had to be more than just a military hero. 
He had to give moral and religious guidance to his people too.11  
 
 
Baybars’ rise to prominence and the murder of Tūrānshāh 
 
Rukn al-Dīn Baybars al-Bunduqdarī, who in 1260 ascended the throne of 
Egypt in 1260 as al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars I, was, like most of his fellow 
mamlūks, a Qipchaq Turk. He was born between 1220 and 1228 
somewhere on the Pontic steppes. His tribe probably fled their land in 
1241/1242 (639 AH12) to the Crimea, possibly in fear of a second Mongol 
onslaught from the East. Thinking they were safe, their camp was raided 
and nearly all members of Baybars’ tribe were killed. Baybars himself was 
among the youths who were sold into slavery. Baybars changed hands a few 
                                                     
10 Fletcher, ‘Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition’, 239. 
11 Inalcık, ‘The Ottoman Succession and Its Relations to the Turkish Concept of 
Sovereignty’, 37-69. 
12 The siglum used to indicate years of the Islamic calendar. The letters stand for 





times, before coming into the possession of the Ayyubid sultan al-Sālih 
Ayyūb and taken to Cairo. In the Ayyubid capital, he entered the royal 
mamlūk household, the Bahriyya, located on al-Rawda Island in the Nile. 
Having nothing to lose but his master’s favour, Baybars’ star rose on 
the battlefield. A pivotal event in his career, and in the history of the Middle 
East, presented itself with the battle of Mansūra and its aftermath. In 1249, 
while Mongol terror was nearing the Ayyubid borders in the East, King 
Louis IX of France (r. 1226-1270), heading the Seventh Crusade (1248-
1254), landed in Damietta and subsequently conquered that city. A few 
months later, while the French troops were headed south with the intention 
to take Cairo, sultan al-Sālih Ayyūb died. In secrecy, a delegation left for 
Damascus to collect al-Sālih’s son, the Syrian viceroy al-Mu‘azzam 
Tūrānshāh (r. 1249-1250). The Ayyubid army, which consisted mainly of 
Mamluk soldiers from the Bahriyya household, clashed with the French 
near Mansūra, on the Nile north of Cairo. The mamlūk force proved 
superior to the French army and when Tūrānshāh entered the scene at the 
end of the day, the battle already was as good as won.  
Victory was only enjoyed briefly as the mood was spoilt by factional 
tensions. The Bahriyya remained loyal to their late master’s widow, Shajarat 
al-Durr, who also was of Turkic origin. Tūrānshāh, who showed a clear 
preference for his own mamlūks, frustrated the political ambitions of the 
Bahriyya and Shajarat al-Durr. Eventually, the Bahriyya, striving to secure 
their position, decided that Tūrānshāh had to be killed and duly murdered 
him. It is likely that Baybars, who by then belonged to the prominent emirs 
of the Bahriyya, was an accomplice in this plot. 
 
 
A lion among its cubs 
 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir probably exaggerates Baybars’ role in the battle of 
Mansūra when he describes, in poetic simile, how Baybars ‘stood among his 
comrades like a sun among the bright stars and like a lion (ka-l-’asad) among 
the cubs it protects’. 13  There is, however, a symbolic content to this 
metaphor too. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir’s seems to pun on the heraldic link 
between Baybars and this animal.  
                                                     
13 Muhyī al-Dīn bin ‘Abd al-Zāhir, al-Rawd al-Zāhir fi sīrat al-Malik al-Zāhir’ [The 
blossoming garden that is the life story of the Conspicuous King] in: Baybars I of 
Egypt, S. F. Sadeque ed. and trans. (Dacca 1956) translation: 77, Arabic text: 2. 





Fig.1: The lion emblem of sultan Baybars. Detail from a relief on the 
Jisr Jindas, a bridge over the Ayalon river in Palestine, commissioned 
by Baybars in 1272. (source: commons.wikimedia.org, author: Eman). 
 
Baybars used the lion passant gardant (fig. 1), a lion walking from right 
to left with the head turned over its left shoulder, as his personal coat of 
arms.14 A relation with the meaning of Baybars’ name, might explain this 
choice. ‘Baybars’ likely is a derivative of the Qipchaq words bäy and bars, 
meaning respectively ‘prince’ and ‘lion’ or ‘panther’.15 But more than just a 
reference to his name, in choosing his emblem, Baybars might also have 
been sensitive to tradition. The ‘lion’, as one among several symbols of 
monarchic sovereignty, was not uncommon in the post-Abbasid Middle 
East. It appeared on architecture and coinage. The Saljuqs strongly 
associated this animal with kingship, possibly appropriating older, Persian 
royal imagery. Several Saljuq sultans adopted the regnal name ‘Arslan’, 
meaning ‘the lion’, and abundantly used the animal to decorate royal 
                                                     
14 C. A. Mayer, Saracenic Heraldry a survey (Oxford 1953) 9, 106-108. 







architecture (fig. 2).16 The Mamluks, or rather Baybars, might have inherited 
this symbol from the Saljuqs. However, there is also a theory that suggests 
that Baybars adopted the lion as an symbol inspired by Mongol coins that 
featured the animal. 17  Whatever the exact inspiration for Baybars’ 
deployment of the lion emblem, sensitivity to a culturally hybrid tradition of 
royal representation might well be it. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Example of the decorative use of lions 
in Saljuq Architecture. Detail of a Yakutiye 
Medressa, Erzurum, Turkey. (source: 
commons.wikimedia.org, author: Bertramz) 
 
To turn to the function of the lion-metaphor in the text, the image of 
a lion among its cubs seems to underscore the position of Baybars among 
the Bahrī emirs as one of primus inter pares. Baybars protected his comrades, 
as if they were his family. This figure of speech is less figurative than it 
might seem. Within the mamlūk household, the soldiers were in fact part of 
the same adopted family. The mamlūks of the same household addressed 
                                                     
16 S. Redford, ‘Thirteenth-century Rum Seljuq Palaces and Palace Imagery’, Ars 
Orientalis 23 (1993); S. Redford, ‘A grammar of Rum Seljuk ornament’, Mésogeios 25-
26 (2005) 283-310. 
17 D. Gasagnadou, ‘Note sur une question d’heraldique mamluke: l’origine du “Lion 
passant à gauche” du sultan Baybars I al-Bunduqdar’, Islam 66 (1989) 98-101. 




each other with ‘akh’, meaning ‘brother’.18 Within this ‘band of brothers’ 
Baybars stood out because of his bravery and physical strength. According 
to Ibn ‘Abd al Zāhir, Baybars already ‘bore the stamp of kingship’ and his 
‘physiognomy revealed what God was to bestow upon him.’ Ibn ‘Abd al-
Zāhir words suggest that Baybars’ strong physique is a manifestation of 
divinely bestowed kingship.19  
 Evidently there was no real blood relation among the Bahriyya  
themselves or their patron al-Sālih. But they did belong to the same 
extended family, of which al-Sālih was the pater familias. Because of this 
near-familial relationship between patron and mamlūks in Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir 
could suggest that the sovereignty of the Ayyubids extended itself to the 
Bahriyya, of whom Baybars was most likely and most suitable to be king. 
This in any case seems to be what the author tries to establish when he 
describes the bond between Baybars and al-Sālih in terms that are usually 
associated with blood relation: 
 
al-Malik al-Zāhir was brought up with al-Malik al-Salih’s refinement, 
and he learned from his noble blood, benefitted from the excellence 
of his kingly endowments and acquired them. He acquired the 
approved virtues of al-Salih and assimilated them. He had natural 
gifts, and in him these lights shone sparkling bright […] thus his 
mind was ambitious to ascend to kingly rank. He was justified in 
seeking to protect the people.20  
 
It is tempting to see in this an echo of the Turkic tradition of ‘collective 
sovereignty’, which holds that the polity, the sultanate, was the common 
possession of the ruling house or clan, in this case the house of the late al-
Sālih Ayyūb, and in extenso the loyal posse of his mamlūks, the Bahriyya.21  
But Baybars’ time had not yet come. Not he, but Aybak would take 
the throne of al-Sālih. Maybe because Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir had to explain this 
flaw in the history of Baybars’ success, he does not style Baybars as the 
murderer of Tūrānshāh. He could have done so, and other chroniclers in 
                                                     
18 D. Ayalon, ‘Mamlūk’, in : C. E. Bosworth, W. P. Hendriks et. al. ed., The 
Encyclopedia of Islam VII (2nd ed. Leiden and Boston 1993) 314-321: 318. 
19 Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, al-Rawd al-zāhir, trans.: 77, Arabic. 2. 
20 Ibidem. 





fact did.22 Although he grants Baybars an important role, it is the Bahriyya 
en groupe who committed regicide: 
 
So al-Malik al-Zāhir and a group of his comrades pounced on al-
Malik al-Mu‘azzam with the fury of a hunting lion, and threw 
themselves upon him like the on-rush of an unleashed torrent, and 
so God had ordained his death.23 
 
If the Altaic rationale is followed, it could be reasoned that the Bahriyya’s 
murder of Tūrānshāh was an legitimate attempt to gain kingship, because 
the rivaling parties belonged to the same divinely favoured house. The short 
and aborted rule of Aybak, who was the first of the Bahrī Mamluks to sit on 
the throne, ‘proved’ however that the sultanate had not yet been granted to 
the member of the house most worthy thereof.24  
 
 
The murder of Qutuz and Baybars’ usurpation 
 
Not long after Tūrānshāh’s murder, the Bahrī commander Aybak al-
Turkmānī became sultan. Soon a rift occurred between Aybak and his own 
royal mamlūk household, called the Mu‘izziyya, on the one hand and his old 
household, the Bahriyya, now led by the emirs Aqtay and Baybars, on the 
other. The conflict soon escalated and Aqtay was murdered by Aybak’s men 
in the citadel. His head was thrown over the Citadel wall on the field 
beneath, where, allegedly it landed at the feet of Baybars, who had 
unsuccessfully come to the rescue. This was a warning not to be ignored 
and that same night Baybars and a large part of the Bahriyya fled to 
Damascus. In foreign service, Baybars took part in several military 
campaigns against Egypt. 
In 1259 the Mu‘izi mamlūk al-Muzaffar Qutuz (r. 1259-1260) became 
sultan. The animosity between Baybars and the new sultan was deep, for it 
                                                     
22 Jamal al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Wāsil, Mufarrij al-Kurūb fī Akhbār Banī Ayyūb / Die 
Chronik des Ibn Wāsil, kritische Edition des letzten Teils (646/1248 – 659/1261) mit 
Kommentaar, Untergang der Ayyubiden und Beginn der Mamluken Herrschaft Arabische 
Studien 6, M. Rahim ed. (Wiesbaden 2010) 77. 
23 Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, al-Rawd al-zāhir, 80.  
24 R. Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages, The early Mamluk sultanate 1250-1382 
(London and Sydney 1986) 44. 




was Qutuz who had killed Aqtay, who moreover had been Baybars’ closest 
friend. Qutuz in his turn, was continually on his guard against the Bahrīs 
and felt he could not rest until Baybars, their leader, was eliminated.25 
In the face of a new menace, however, Baybars and Qutuz had no 
alternative but to join forces. In 1258 the Mongols had conquered and 
ransacked Baghdad, killing the Abbasid caliph. Now, the Mongols were 
coveting the remains of the Ayyubid sultanate. War was imminent and 
Qutuz sought reconciliation with Baybars. The united army of the Mamluks 
met their Mongol adversaries at ‘Ayn Jālūt in northern Palestine. 
The battle ended in a Mamluk victory, and afterwards Qutuz became 
the ruler of both Egypt and Syria. Before the battle, he had promised the 
governorship of Aleppo to Baybars. Now he broke his word, appointing 
another candidate. With old animosity thus revived, Qutuz decided to get 
rid of Baybars. He left Damascus, considering Cairo the most suitable place 
to set up an ambush. Baybars, however, had been informed about Qutuz’s 
plan and followed the sultan on his way to Egypt. It was his intention to kill 
the sultan, before he was killed himself. According to most sources, an 
opportunity presented itself when Qutuz decided to leave the road to go on 
a short hunting expedition. According to Shāfi‘ bin ‘Alī, a nephew of Ibn 
‘Abd al-Zāhir who made an abridgment of his uncle’s vita, Baybars’ men set 
loose a rabbit or hare (’arnab) and, when Qutuz chased it, the conspirators 
followed and slew the sultan.26 Allegedly, Baybars and his men rode back to 
Qutuz’s army tent, where several men were gathered, among them 
the’atābak i.e. the chief in command of the army, and several emirs of the 
Mu‘iziyya. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir describes how, after a unclear difference of 
opinion, the emirs agreed Baybars should be sultan. The same night Baybars 





                                                     
25 P. Thorau, Sultan Baibars I. von Ägypten, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Vorderen Orients 
im 13. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden 1987) 98-100. 
26 Shāfi‘ bin ‘Alī bin ‘Abbās, Husn al-Manāqib al-Siriyya al-muntaza’a min as-sīra al-
Zāhiryya, A.-A. al-Hutayt ed. (2nd edition Riyad 1989) 66; Thorau, Sultan Baibars I., 
56-62. 
27 Shāfi‘ bin ‘Alī bin ‘Abbās, Husn al-Manāqib, 68; Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, al-Rawd al-Zāhir, 





The law of the Turks 
 
All the sources but al-Zāhir acknowledge Baybars as the chief conspirator in 
the plot to kill Qutuz, but they do not mention him as the murderer. Most 
sources agree that it was his silahdār, the ‘arms bearer’, who killed sultan 
Qutuz.28 Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir emphatically refutes this. He claims that it was 
Baybars who delivered the fatal thrust into the sultan’s stomach: ‘The sultan 
al-Malik al-Zāhir did this himself and attained his object alone.’29 Given Ibn 
‘Abd al-Zāhir’s strong bias towards his patron, it seems likely that he wants 
to prove Baybars directly responsible for a reason. This reason, it seems, is 
legitimating Baybars’ usurpation itself. Whereas it was of less importance 
for Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir to style Baybars as the murderer of Tūrānshāh, it was 
apparently essential in this case to portray Baybars as the killer of Qutuz. 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, by mouth of the ’atābak, uses Baybars’ regicide as an 
argument to assert that Baybars should take the throne. The setting is the 
audience tent (dihlīz) of Qutuz: 
 
The sultan [Baybars] sat beside the cushion (tarraha) [when] a 
difference of opinion arose in the course of discussion. Then the 
Atabek said: “Listen, O our friends, by God, if al-Malik al-Muzaffar 
were alive, or if he had a son to whom we had pledged our allegiance, 
I would have been the first one to fight with my sword. But now the 
opportunity has passed, and there is no doubt that the person who 
killed him at his own peril and performed this great task, did surely 
not do it for the sake of another person, and not sacrifice and 
endanger himself so that the authority might go to someone else, and 
so he who killed him deserves his position”. The sultan said: “I am 
the one who has done this thing”. The party agreed to this. Then the 
sultan rose and sat on the cushion, and the party remained silent.30  
 
When the ’atābak explains that most of the men present ‘are unemployed’ 
and ‘come out of great difficulties’, Baybars takes an oath, solemnly 
swearing to protect their interest. After this act, one by one the emirs and all 
the others present swear their oath of fealty to Babyars, acknowledging him 
as sultan.31  
                                                     
28 Thorau, Sultan Baibars I, 100-105. 
29 Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, al-Rawd al-Zāhir, 96. 
30 Ibidem. 
31 Ibidem. 




In the description of this scene there are three elements that are 
clearly reminiscent of Turkic custom regarding the accession of a new Khan. 
First, Baybars’ elevation to the throne by peer election seems to harken 
back to tribal acclamation ceremonies, as described by Fletcher.32 Baybars 
was appointed sultan by the emirs, not unlike a new khan would be 
acclaimed by tribal leaders. Secondly, the setting in which the oaths of fealty 
were sworn, as depicted by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, is significant. It is a tent, 
rather than a palace, throne hall, or any other edifice that typically 
accommodates the accession practices of sedentary peoples. A new study 
has shown that during the early Mamluk sultanate, the Mamluks associated 
the tent with royal authority and used it as a place for public, royal 
representation; a locus for political palaver, agreeing with the practice of the 
Qipchaq steppes.33 In this context it should be noted that a special cushion 
(tarraha) fulfills the function of a royal seat. Only later, it must be admitted, 
an accession ceremony would take place in Cairo, followed by a procession 
and a banquet, to celebrate the succession in a more urban style. Thirdly, 
and most convincingly, Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir lets the ’atābak formulate the 
principle of ‘bloody tanistry’ that scholarship has associated with Turkic 
practices of royal succession: he who most violently proves his will and 
ability to be king by killing his contester shall rule.  
This norm is even explicitly associated with Turkish lore in an 
abridgement of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir’s text by his nephew, Shafi‘i bin ‘Ali:  
  
“What does the law of the Turks (’asat al-Turk) say?” They 
answered: “That kingship should go to him who has killed.” He 
then replied: “And who is the one who has killed?” “He,” they 
answered, pointing at al-Malik al-Zāhir [Baybars]. He then took 
him by his hand and made him sit as king [on the royal 
cushion]34 
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Khowayter, the editor of the text of Shāfi‘ī bin ‘Alī, explains this word ’asa 
as ‘law’ (qanūn), ‘rule’ (nizām) or ‘procedure’ (nahj). 35  Etymologically, the 
word is said to be akin to yāsā(q). This word has been used by Mamluk 
authors to describe Turkic or Mongol customary law, as distinct from the 
Muslim sharia.36 It might be proposed that it is in this sense, that the word is 
used here. In Arabic, the word ‘Turk’ could refer to a variety of Turkic or 
Mongoloid peoples. The fact that Shāfi‘ī bin ‘Alī states that Baybars was ‘of 
Turkish ethnicity’ (turkī al-jins) seems to demonstrate that the word is used 
first and foremost to refer to the likes of Baybars’, that is the Turkic 
mamlūks.37 The Mongols, on the other hand, are referred to as al-Tatar.  
If ’asat al-Turk indeed is a reference to the native customs of the 
mamlūks, there might have been a strong Qipchaq element in it, as most of 
the Mamluks were of Qipchaq origin. This poses a problem: the Qipchaqs 
did not have a monarchic tradition, because they were a loose federation of 
tribes.38 A way out of this might be that the principle of tanistry also applied 
to non-state forms of political organization. If not the succession of khans, 
then maybe that of tribal chiefs was governed by this principle? Another 
explanation could be that the word Turk had a broader and more general 
meaning. Could ’asat al-Turk then refer to the custom of violent succession 
as rehearsed within other ‘Turkic’ states, such as the Saljuq sultanate?39 
Before drawing any conclusions, two last observation need to be 
made. The first is that neither Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir’s nor Shāfi‘ī bin ‘Alī 
deemed it necessary to prove that Qutuz’s reign was illegitimate. Ibn ‘Abd 
al-Zāhir even insinuates the opposite, when he lets the ’atābak say: ‘if al-
Malik al-Muzaffar were alive, or if he had a son to whom we had pledged 
our allegiance, I would have been the first one to fight with my sword.’40 
This, apparently, expresses the view that Baybars aborted the regency of a 
legitimate ruler. Does Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir acknowledge that Qutuz, via his 
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master, Aybak, who originally was a Bahrī mamlūk, had inherited a legal 
share in al-Sālih’ sovereignty? The second observation is that, according to 
Ibn Abd al-Zāhir’s, no one of the men present, not even the emirs of the 
Mu‘iziyya, expressed the need for further retaliation upon learning of the 
death of their sultan. Apparently Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir could convincingly use 
the costum of tanistry to conclusively prove Baybars’ right to the throne. 
These two observations taken into consideration, it could tentatively 
be argued that Baybars’ usurpation is represented as the final and 
concluding act – à la Turca – in a struggle for succession among contenders 
with an equal right to the throne.  
 
 
Internal legitimacy  
 
A final question is of importance: did Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir include these 
Turkic elements to convince a specific audience of Baybars’ right to the 
throne? To answer this question, it seems wise to first say a few things more 
about Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir himself; his position at court and the origin and 
intention of his biography. 
  Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir came from a family of scribes and had excellent 
credentials. He was soon appointed Head of the Chancellery by Baybars, 
who trusted him with the composition of official letters both regarding 
internal matters and diplomacy. His biography of Baybars he wrote under 
strict supervision of his master, who would reward his scribe with robes of 
honour after completing a section that was to the his satisfaction. Baybars 
needed the literary cunning of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir for political effect, whereas 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir enjoyed the privileges and royal protection that came with 
this capacity.41 It is within the context of this relationship, that the text of 
the biography should be understood. It is safe to say that Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir 
was concerned to offer a legitimizing framework that explained Baybars rise 
to power and usurpation.   
 Based on elements in the text itself, it can be said that Ibn ‘Abd al-
Zāhir directed his words to one group in particular. On several occasions, 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir describes how Baybars was loyal to the emirs of the realm 
and served their interests well. It seems reasonable to suggest that one of 
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the objectives of the text was to please this very group, and therefore the 
Mamluk military elite itself should be included in the audience of the text.  
Indeed, the fact that Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir so elaborately describes how 
Baybars is declared sultan by his emirs might be a first indication that the 
main characters of this passage and the intended audience of the text 
overlap. The author describes how the emirs present in the dihlīz swear the 
oath of loyalty to their sultan. He also describes emphatically that this act 
was reciprocated:  
 
The Atabek said to the sultan: “Most of the people of this party are 
unemployed and they have come out of great difficulties; hence the 
sultan should take the oath to them that he would help them” […] 
The sultan swore the oath to them.42 
 
Other passages in the text also suggest an internal orientation. In a 
paragraph entitled ‘his acts on behalf of his comrades’ [dhikra ma i‘tamadahu 
fī haqqi khujdashiyyatihi], it is explained how Baybars, throughout his career, 
had the interest of his peers at heart.43 Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir describes how, 
after times of hardship during the reign of Tūrānshāh and during their exile, 
Baybars restored the position of the emirs who were his comrades and 
belonged to his khujdashiyya (also spelled khushdashiyya).44  
 
When God bestowed the kingdom on him, nothing diverted his 
attention from doing good to the older and younger ones of them, 
and he promoted them, whereas before they had believed that they 
would never regain their previous position; and he reunited them, 
whereas before they had dispersed in the country and hidden 
themselves till no one dare to use a word of Turkish or military 
saying.45 
 
The reference to language of the Turks is significant, and seems to indicate 
two things. First, the Bahrī Mamluks spoke a Turkic language among 
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themselves − this can be corroborated by the fact that Baybars on some 
occasions used an Arabic interpreter.46 Turkic speech probably served as an 
identity marker, here invoked by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir to appeal to a notion of 
‘Turkicness’ apparently shared between Baybars and his comrades. 
Because of the Turkic background of the Mamluks, and maybe 
because they inherited Altaic influences from the Ayyubids, who were of 
Kurdish descent, in a way, the ‘way of the steppes’ still mattered in the 
Mamluk elite. Altaic notions of sovereignty and kingship were part of the 
Mamluk political frame of reference. It was crucial because he needed to 
appeal to this frame of reference in explaining his position to the 
khujdashiyya. This was essential because Baybars needed them to endorse 
his position. He needed to capitalize on their support, and so help needed 
them to build his empire. Therefore, besides being styled as a virtuous ruler 
of Islam, Baybars is portrayed as a tribal Heerkönig to explain his position 
and power to his mamlūk ranks of support.47 The fact that Ibn ‘Abd al-
Zāhir, who himself was not of a Mamluk but of local origin, very well knew 
how to paint this hybrid image can be explained by his function as Head of 
the Chancellery, which put him in the engine room of the sultanate. It is 






Two notions recurred in Altaic traditions of kingship. The first is that 
sovereignty lays within the royal clan in its entirety. Consequently, kingship 
is open to all members of the ruling family. The second is that the most 
talented and physically apt member of the royal clan should inherit the 
throne, commonly through murder and war. This principle has been called 
tanistry. The ideological underpinning of this view, is that kinship cannot be 
acquired through a man-made institution but by divine appointment only.  
 It could tentatively be argued that these two notions echo in the 
biography of Baybars by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir. Concerned to explain his rise to 
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power and usurpation of the Sultanate, he framed these events in a 
legitimatizing discourse. In doing so Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir appeals to a hybrid 
frame of reference that includes the Altaic notions of clan-sovereignty and 
tanistry. It could be argued that Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir indicates that the 
Bahriyya rightfully acquired sovereignty by killing Tūrānshāh. This crooked 
king, according to the historian, was a unworthy successor and by 
murdering him the Bahris executed divine will. Among the Bahriyya, it was 
Baybars, with his ‘kingly endowments and natural gifts’, who was physically 
and morally the most suitable one to be king. This became manifest when 
he killed Qutuz, the last of the Mamluk pretenders to the throne.  
 Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir was well versed in the ideological sensitivities that 
played a part in the dynamics of succession, and it has been suggested he 
consciously applied an Altaic frame of reference to legitimize Baybars’ 
position, especially to entice the sultan’s fellow Mamluks. Baybars remained 
to a large extent dependent upon his khujdashiyya to built his empire. In 
explaining Baybar’s coup by referring to shared, native notions of kingship, 
and integrating them into the Islamic cadre of reference, the emir’s 
acceptance of his rule and their support was sought.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
